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Historical dates have traditionally served as 
something more than mere conventions used 
to help historians carve up time, punctuate mo-
ments and create meaning regarding the past. 
Specific years such as 1968 and 1989 act as 
landmarks, not least because they correspond-
ed to landslide events; they also act as a synec-
doche for greater sets of events, meanings and 
processes, having acquired some kind of tran-
scendental Gestalt of their own. Even more in-
terestingly, some of these “moments of change” 
– linked to social movements and popular revo-
lutions – have been seen as interconnected. 
In this article, I focus on three separate moments 
– 1968, 1989 and 2011 – in order to trace the 
changes in the way in which social movements 
were theoretically framed on a research lev-
el since the 1960s.1 Rather than focusing on the 
real or imaginary connections that activists often 
create with the contestatory past (or the rejection 
thereof),2 I try to demonstrate the ways in which 
specialists (who were often directly implicated in 
the events) theorised those moments and forged 
genealogies between them. In this respect, I will 
argue that 1968 was the starting moment that 
defined to a greater or lesser extent how we still 
view and experience collective mobilisations. Al-
though our perspective on the “long Sixties” has 
evolved significantly over time, and despite a brief 
interlude in 1989, this extended decade generated 
the conceptual tools through which we still make 
sense of social movements. Finally, this article 
serves as an intellectual history of the literature 
on contentious politics. 
1968: The vertex 
The vertex for social movements3 during the 
second half of the twentieth century is surely the 
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1960s. 1968, in particular, was the annus mirrabilis of social protest in the postindustrial world; it 
was a polymorphic, global movement, with broad participation from all social strata and equally 
broad objectives that ranged from the very specific, such as better infrastructure at universities, to 
the very general, such as the abolition of authoritarian structures in state and society.4 Moreover, 
new social subjects – primarily women, students and regional groups – seemed to replace the 
working-class movement as the historical actor par excellence in terms of contestatory action – 
even if thinkers such as Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno thought that there was a revival of 
class conflict in the mobilisations of that time.5
Interestingly, up to that point, social movement theory had been driven by such dated classics as 
Gustav Le Bon’s The Crowd (1895), or more recent – but equally problematic – works such as Wil-
liam Kornhauser’s The Politics of Mass Society (1959), which interpreted social movements with 
antipathy through the lens of irrationality and pathology.6 1968 was a clear break from this tradi-
tion insofar as efforts were made to interpret the movements synchronically and in a positive light. 
In a major example of this tendency, Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort and Edgar Morin – for 
some, the intellectual “fathers” of the événements – published the collective volume La Brèche in 
the immediate aftermath of May ’68; unlike theorists before them, they sought to achieve a socio-
logical and philosophical evaluation of a recent movement in which they were personally involved.
1968 also gave birth to the so-called new social movements (NSMs), encompassing second-wave 
feminism, environmental movements, gay rights movements, campaigns of racial or ethnic mi-
norities, among others. An entire crop of social scientists went to analyse the changes in tone and 
orientation of these new “cultural” movements. According to the consensus view on new social 
movements, their novelty was that they posited issues of identity in the same peremptory way that 
the movements of the past posited issues of social class, disputing the latter’s centrality in politi-
cal developments. They vigorously rejected the old left, were deeply suspicious of the state7 and 
proposed a radical reform not only of the political, but also of the personal field – hence abolishing 
the boundaries between the collective and the individual. If the traditional social movements aimed 
first and foremost at a redistribution of wealth and greater access to the decision-making centres, 
the new social movements emphasised autonomy and resistance to social control. Along with this 
change in orientation, their repertoire of contention shifted dramatically compared to movements 
of the past, as they promoted nonhierarchical forms of organisation, based on horizontal, decen-
tralised and “disorganised” social networks. Finally, their demands were more qualitative and usu-
ally nonnegotiable. These claims added a dimension of intense expressivity because, above all, they 
were statements of identity and lifestyle.8
Among those who characterised these movements as “new” were ringleaders of the 1968 move-
ments and in general persons in close contact with them; they did so while the movements were 
still unfolding – something which was quite problematic due to the lack of critical distance. The 
French sociologist Alain Touraine, who was very close to the movement of Nanterre and May ’68, 
was the first to differentiate the traditional social movements of the past from the movements of 
the present. As Touraine himself notes: “The idea of social movement was conceived, at least in 
my mind, in opposition to the traditional concept of class conflict.”9 








Touraine and other young scholars of the era were guided, beyond their scientific intentions, by an 
admittedly political intent. Specifically, Claus Offe was a student leader in West Germany, Gareth 
Stedman Jones was a leading member of the New Left Review, Barbara Taylor was a radical fem-
inist and Luisa Passerini a situationist.10 This trend is clearly visible in other research sectors that 
emerged at the time, from studies of social gender to oral history; theory and action, scholarship 
and activism became interwoven.11 By way of historicising this tendency, one should of course note 
that in the “long 1960s” the tenor was also dictated by Frantz Fanon, Mao Zedung and Che Guevara, 
who just like Marx, Engels, Lenin or Gramsci were not only actively involved in revolution but also 
engaged in improving theories of revolution. It seemed that things had come a long way from the 
famous Thesis 11 on Feuerbach by Marx; the philosophers were interpreting the world while also 
trying to change it. 
Hermeneutic framing of 1968 and the 1960s
Three main approaches have been developed in the hermeneutic framing of 1968 and as a re-
sponse to the plethora of protest movements and new revolutionary subjects that emerged in its 
aftermath. First of all, a “structuralist” approach in social-movement theorising appeared on the 
other side of the Atlantic. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald articulated in 1977 what would become the 
hegemonic paradigm in terms of social movement theory: the “resource mobilisation” approach. 
Founded on the axiom that a necessary prerequisite for a movement’s success is the mobilisa-
tion of structural resources, this theory, in evolving forms, has persisted for decades. Equally en-
during is the thinking of the so-called “patriarchs” of social movement theory, Sidney Tarrow and 
Charles Tilly, and, specifically, their theories of political opportunity structures (which emerge at 
specific moments, for example when a system of power seems vulnerable to social change) and 
protest cycles (which result from the widening of political opportunities that create motives for col-
lective action that might last as long as the ten years of the Italian Sessantotto). Tarrow and Tilly 
insisted, moreover, that spontaneity in social movements is a misleading factor of analysis, and 
that any kind of dispute requires pre-existing organisational structures.12 Here we should empha-
sise that these views, set forth in the 1970s and 1980s, became, and still remain to some extent, 
the predominant scientific paradigm – the so-called “political process” school – to the extent that 
even sudden explosions and short-lived unrest are viewed by social scientists through this prism. 
Hence, a large part of the conceptual tools that we use to this day in order to understand and give 
meaning to social movements dates back to theories from the 1970s and 1980s that examined the 
après-1968 new social movements. 
It should be stressed that all these gurus of social movement theory were concerned with the 
movements that followed 1968 – and very few of them with 1968 itself, and the 1960s in gener-
al.13 The systematic efforts for the interpretation of 1968 commenced in the late 1990s and subse-
quently, when the hermeneutic framing of new social movements also changed. This is because 
the interpretations no longer came from the activists of the 1960s themselves, who were theoris-
ing their experiences, or at least from people who had experienced the movements firsthand, but 
from younger researchers. Also, it is noteworthy that, in comparison to the North American expe-
rience and the flowering of theories about social movements, it took ten more years for European 
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researchers, such as Dieter Rucht in Germany or Donatella della Porta in Italy, to present robust 
research regarding the social movements in western Europe.14 
If there is something remarkable in regard to social movement theories up to 1990, it is that they 
produced speculation concerning the fragile processes of collective action formation, without con-
sidering conflict dynamics as implicit. However, apart from being an asset, their focus on “collec-
tive subjects” was also their greatest disadvantage, because it removed the emphasis on the indi-
vidual, lived experience, thus excluding biographical approaches.15 Furthermore, a large number 
of these researchers dealt almost exclusively with radical ideologies and political protest, ignoring 
significant parts of the movements that concerned culture or counterculture.16 So, in contrast to the 
so-called “postmodern condition”, where small-scale themes supersede grand narratives centred 
on issues concerning work and class division, and despite the modernist dimension of new social 
movements, we may observe that the effort to evaluate them through research during the 1970s 
and 1980s was undertaken in piecemeal fashion, and with much less vigour than that possessed 
by the very same social movements on which it sought to elaborate. 
Since in the early 1990s, there has been an effort to counteract these disadvantages, and this marks 
the development of the second main approach, namely the “culturalist” one. Some of the major 
figures in this turn include Alberto Melucci and Enrique Laraña, who focus on issues of identity,17 
Doug McAdam, Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jameson, in their work on cognitive liberation as a key 
process for the emergence of conflictuality, and David Snow, in highlighting the significance of the 
theory of hermeneutic framing for social action.18 Projects such as these represented a paradigm 
shift to progressively more cultural approaches, focusing on culture, biography, identity, emotions 
and affect,19 moving away, as it were, from the hitherto dominant structural approach to social 
movements. The way in which activists imagined the changes that their actions would bring about 
in addition to the ways in which they evaluated them ex post facto – activists’ subjectivity in other 
words – began to be treated as equally important as the action itself.20
On the other hand, however, social movement theories remained somewhat indifferent in regard 
to the so-called establishment or the “system” – hence being unable to evaluate in detail the impact 
of protest on the wider political field.21 Although it is erroneous to judge social movements only by 
their outcomes, excluding this dimension is certainly a drawback in regard to their thorough inter-
pretation. The big question that remains unanswered by the culturalist tendency is what are the 
consequences of the movements on the political system or political culture; the macroscale of so-
cial protest, in other words, in relation to the microscale – the assessment of general theoretical 
dimensions together with subjective experience, and their interaction. While theory has certainly 
evolved over the last 20 years, especially with the “political process” theorists who emerged in the 
1990s to focus on the dynamics of state–society relations, unfortunately this stake is not always 
satisfied.22 
Moreover, sociological theories monopolised the interest in the specific field for approximately two 
decades. Only in the late 1980s and early 1990s did historians, such as Ronald Fraser and Luisa 
Passerini, make an effort to approach the 1960s mostly at the level of memory.23 The 1990s and 
the proceeding decade sealed the shift of research on 1968 from the social sciences into the hands 








of nonsociologists – such as Robert Lumley with States of Emergency and Gerd Rainer Horn with 
The Spirit of 1968.24 It is, we might say, the moment of the dynamic entry of the humanities into 
the analysis of social movements of the past, which was surely missing. And here we should also 
mention the late British historian Arthur Marwick who, in 2000, published a hugely influential book, 
The Sixties, in which he essentially proposed an alternative periodisation, what has since entered 
the bibliography as “the long 1960s”.25 
In the middle and end of the first decade of the 2000s, there appeared two new subtrends of the 
historical revisiting of the long 1960s and their aftermath, what we could call the “revisionist” trend. 
One concerns a viewing of the 1968 movements as a transnational phenomenon; it deemphasises 
specific national case-studies, instead privileging networks, interconnections and communication 
between movements, cultural transfers and mobility.26 The other trend concerns an evaluation of 
the so-called après-1968, that is, not so much with the events themselves, but with what followed 
afterwards, their Nachleben. Emblematic of this trend is the book May ’68 and its Afterlives by Kris-
tin Ross,27 as well as an idiosyncratic production of testimonies, not of the protagonists but of either 
their parents or their offspring. A characteristic example of such testimonies is Stuart Hilwig’s work 
on the parents of some of the leading figures of the Italian ’68. Other striking examples include 
The day my father shut up by Virginie Linhart, daughter of Robert Linhart, a Maoist leader of May 
’68, and With one foot stuck in history, by Anna Negri, daughter of the well-known philosopher and 
leader of the Italian Autonomia, Toni Negri. Their common denominator is that the inheritance of 
the 1960s and 1970s is treated as a burden. “We were prisoners of their world, their dream, their 
plan,” Linhart writes about her activist parents.28 What is equally interesting, at least in Italy, is that 
soon after these books were published, the history of the 1960s and 1970s began to be narrated 
also by the children of the anti-68ers or the victims of leftwing terrorism, thus establishing a pecu-
liar sort of memory battle staged by the offspring.29 
By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, when these writings appeared, momentous changes 
and dramatic sociopolitical transformations had already taken place: the collapse of the iron cur-
tain regimes, the loss of a solid point of reference such as the Soviet Union, the marginalisation of 
communism and the metanarrative of the class struggle and the passage from a bi- to a multipo-
lar world – all this was symbolically summed up in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. As the Ital-
ian historian Alessandro Portelli writes, any subsequent viewing of 1968 – at least at the level of 
memory – is therefore doomed to be mediated by 1989.30
1989: A reverse 1968?
So far, we have talked about 1968 and the reverberations of that pivotal moment in historical lit-
erature. But how did these frameworks translate in the understanding of 1989? Three approaches 
stand out. First of all, the “continuation” theory, which was characterised by the tendency – a temp-
tation perhaps – to view 1989 as the natural extension of 1968 in Eastern Europe. Thinkers such 
as the British and American historians Timothy Garton Ash31 and Padraic Kenney,32 who have both 
focused systematically on eastern europe, have posited that there exists a relationship of causal-
ity between the two dates, especially in Warsaw but above all in Prague. In fact, Garton Ash point-
ed out the fact that Czechs in 1989 actively linked the two dates, both by chanting “Dubček–Havel” 
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and remarking that the number 89 is 68 turned upside down.33 Similarly, American political scien-
tist David Ost and German historian Stefan Garsztecki argued that Solidarność in Poland was the 
product of the “new left” and “radicals of ’68”,34 while American sociologist Gil Eyal argued that the 
counter-elites that emerged in Czechoslovakia were a byproduct of 1968 and reform communism, 
only to subsequently define themselves against it.35 
Considering a linearity between 1968 and 1989 as a given seems extremely problematic. Luisa 
Passerini has rightly pointed out that it is the lack of historicisation of both dates that leads to a 
hermeneutical deficiency linking the two moments in a perverse way, whereby the economic liber-
alism of the 1990s is interpreted as the natural continuation of the social and cultural libertarianism 
of the 1960s by other means.36 If there is a defining aspect of this relationship, however (beyond 
the fact that there were many 1989s, as there were many 1968s), it is that while in 1968 Alexander 
Dubček became a symbol throughout the Eastern bloc and the “third way” became the vision of 
young Eastern Europeans, 1989 definitively put these ideas to rest. In the memoirs of protagonists, 
such as Jacek Kuroń, or even Václav Havel himself, there is a strong resentment for the transition 
from the utopia of so-called “socialism with a human face” to the realism of unconstrained neolib-
eralism, the transition from Dubček to Thatcher.37
In light of this outcome, a second strand of analysis was the so-called “reverse revolution” theory. 
This was articulated by thinkers who rushed to proclaim the events of 1989 as more of a return to 
the past than a revolution looking to the future.38 Certainly the most significant intervention and ef-
fort to understand the events of 1989 as a reverse revolution came from Jürgen Habermas, in his 
1992 article “What does socialism mean today?”.39 What Habermas points out in view of the move-
ments of 1989 is the complete lack of innovative ideas and the total reinstatement of civic values. 
Although for many, the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 meant a shift away from the values of the 
French revolution and the Enlightenment – and of the western revolutionary tradition in general – 
1989 refuted the inheritance of 1917. According to Habermas, this was the first revolution that not 
only condoned the class system, but in fact it demanded its full recovery. The title of an article by 
Eric Hobsbawm in the same volume is rather telling: “Goodbye to all that”. 
A third tendency was the “civil society”-driven one. It was characterised by the departure from the 
supposed relationship to 1968 or the nonrelationship to 1917, to a viewing of 1989 as an autono-
mous or independently significant revolution, a grandiose totemic movement, which was the result 
of the awakening of civil society.40 Francis Fukuyama’s “the end of history” and Misha Glenny’s “re-
birth of history” approach could be ascribed to this tendency.41 Equally interesting was the reversal 
of this theory. On the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, various researchers subverted 
the premise of the dynamic civil society, questioning whether 1989 was indeed a bottom–up revo-
lution. Historians Steven Kotkin and Jan Gross, for example, used the provocative term “uncivil so-
ciety”, presenting 1989 as the result of the decline of the communist elites at the top and reminding 
us that the truly multitudinous Solidarność of Lech Walesa in Poland was not at all a representative 
example of social mobilisation.42 According to this line of argument, apart from Solidarność, col-
lectivities with specific demands in Eastern European countries were strict minorities, if they ex-
isted at all. Only when the collapse of the regimes became a given did the silent majorities take to 
the streets. This is a viewpoint that rejected the possibility that social subjects in the Eastern bloc 








could develop autonomous action and, thus, refused to acknowledge them agency, in a tacit dis-
sonance with the 1968 revolts. Thus 1989, via this top–down interpretation, represents an interlude 
in the studies of social movements and revolution, a direct challenge to the social movement theo-
ries that, since the 1990s, have given more priority to activists’ subjectivity and agency. However, 
the fact that, past a certain point, politicians in Eastern European countries in 1989 had very little 
control over events that were speeding along on their own, remains to a great extent unexplained, 
with only a few notable exceptions. For example, political economist Cornel Ban challenges Kotkin 
and Gross’s insights by way of an interdisciplinary analysis on how the complex transformations 
structured by the debt crisis of the early 1980s, regime ideology and citizen protest in 1980s, rather 
than simple endogenous regime meltdown, interacted in ways that ultimately led to the end of the 
Ceausescu regime in Romania.43
All in all, the analysis of 1989 did not manage to move beyond 1968 categories regarding collec-
tive action, and its interpretation still depends on political contingencies. It did not manage to cre-
ate its own credible separate categories of analysis, nor did it revolutionise social movement the-
ory or bring about a paradigm shift. Moreover, as 1989 did not take place in Western Europe, but 
in Eastern Europe and within a cold war legacy, contrary to 1968 theorists did not participate but 
contemplated this from the West and from a certain (conceptual) distance. Even the ones who did 
participate in the events – like Garton Ash, who theorised his experience – were outside observ-
ers/participants rather than local actors, organically linked to the movements.44 Last, but not least, 
in terms of the US experience it has to be noted that the 1989 moment was not deemed of revolu-
tionary importance in general, since it did not have any particular ramifications in terms of ideolo-
gies or political parties – in stark contrast, for example, to the strong communist parties of West-
ern Europe which all suffered an enormous blow.
2011: A new 1968, another 1989 or something new?
In accordance with the uncivil society approach regarding 1989, the 1990s were characterised by 
a retreat of the radical protest waves of the previous decades. This led many social movement 
scholars to rush to confirm that this was the inauguration of a “social movement society”:45 exist-
ing movements, in other words, were now largely characterised by reformism and distinguished 
by their tendency to be incorporated and co-opted by prevailing political institutions. It is notewor-
thy that in this context, and contrary to the tendency of the 1960s and 1970s, the gap between ac-
tivists and academics seemed to widen.46 Things started to change once again when the global 
justice movement partly refuted the relevant discourse, giving rise to a plethora of bottom–up 
movements. These had as their peak the Seattle protest during the WTO ministerial conference 
(1999) and the Genoa protest during the G8 summit (2001); during the latter, the killed activist Carlo 
Giuliani became a symbol of civil unrest. The new millennium was also characterised by a reacti-
vation of riots, set around France in 2005, Greece in 2008 and England in 2011.47 
The year 2011, in particular, seemed to be a moment of change with respect to the relationship be-
tween theory and action. The Arab spring and the indignados (indignant) movements in Spain, Greece, 
Israel, Chile and elsewhere, and, of course, the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US were, at least 
initially, seen as dynamic game changers in terms of contentious politics. The extensive use of new 
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technologies and the glocal nature of these movements (“thinking globally, acting locally”) were cited 
as a proof, in this respect, and it is precisely in this field that the most original research has appeared 
so far – like, for example, Jennifer Earl and Katrina Kimports’ work on the “digital repertoire of con-
tention” and W. Lance Bennett’s work on “connective action”.48 But historical framing seemed to lead 
the way. Two tentative propositions stand out. One is the framing of the Arab uprisings of 2011 as “an-
other 1989”. A typical example is provided by American political transition theorist Michael Kennedy, 
who underlined the common elements between the two moments; these included the tremendous 
speed of events, the transnational diffusion of protest and the introduction of huge institutional chang-
es (at times peacefully, at others not). Not to mention the fact that both moments caught the local elit-
es unawares and western governments unprepared.49 In this respect, Kennedy argues, both events 
represent an authentic form of “refolution” – a combination between reforms and revolution. But in 
his effort at a hermeneutic framing guided by history, Kennedy did not fail to compare 2011 with 1968 
either. In fact, he argued that the danger for the 2011 movements would be to “become” 1968 instead 
of 1989, maintaining that their low degree of organisation and the lack of leaders – a shared charac-
teristic with the 1968 movements – could prove fatal in regard to their long-term effect at the politi-
cal level. The nontransformation of movements into parties or pressure groups constitutes a great 
danger, Kennedy concludes, without, however, also mentioning the multiple dangers inherent in the 
movements’ institutionalisation, their incorporation into the system and their eventual commerciali-
sation – the nullification of their movement potential, in other words. Kennedy’s assessment that the 
1968 movement failed at the political level, however, has to do with the erroneous practice of judging 
movements solely by their tangible political outcomes. 
In stark contrast to this view is the second theory that considers the 2011 movements as carriers of 
the positive “current of 1968”. One of the apostles of this theory is Immanuel Wallerstein, a pioneer 
of social movement theory and originator of the term “antisystemic movement”, who claimed in an 
op-ed that if there is something interesting about the 2011 movements, it is precisely the fact that 
they share common features with 1968:50 first, they are uprisings against antidemocratic behav-
iour by arbitrary authority structures; second, the movements have horizontal organisational struc-
tures, which facilitate peaceful protest; and third, they facilitate the emergence of all sorts of mi-
norities as active revolutionary subjects – something which is strongly reminiscent of the theories 
of Herbert Marcuse in the 1960s regarding the wretched of the earth who supposedly constituted 
the new revolutionary subjects par excellence.51 Among the obvious disadvantages in Wallerstein’s 
analysis, however, is its omission of the attraction that armed revolutionary movements and third 
worldism held for the 1968 movements and their presentation as totally peaceful in character. 
Both these theories point to the impossibility to escape the historical past. If for 1968 there were 
dates against which it was constantly weighed or paralleled (1848 being one of them), for 2011 the 
1960s and 1980s seem to be the other dynamic “alter egos”. Historical framing of the present by 
way of the past reached an apogee in the case of the Occupy movement in the US. The fact that the 
founder of the Vancouver-based anticonsumerist magazine and organisation Adbusters (whose 
call to occupy Wall Street kicked off the Occupy movement) made direct references to the Situa-
tionist International as his most powerful source of inspiration,52 while shortly afterwards former 
SDS leader Todd Gitlin published a book drawing on his own role as a student leader as a means 
to conceptualise the current movement, are illustrative of the long shadow of the 1960s.53 








Lastly, no radical departure has taken place from the new social movement paradigm that has 
shaped our understanding of social action so far and none is really in sight, despite the radical shift 
in the social and political environment. And this despite the fact – apart from the chronotopical dis-
tance from earlier times – that these “newly found” movements (and especially the Arab spring) 
lacked available resources and organisational and mobilisation structures. Even though they were 
a far cry from the axiom posited by Zald and Tilly, however, no one has yet accounted for the fact 
that they actively put to question this once-dominant paradigm that relied on the concept of rational 
activist choice based on existing resources.54 Moreover, the Arab spring demonstrated that despite 
the fact that social movement theories had tried previously to expand geographically – analysing 
the Zapatistas in Mexico or the Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Sem Terra) in Bra-
zil, which Michel Wieviorka labels “global movements”55 – the mainstream academic understand-
ing of social action remains extremely western-centric (not to say Americanocentric) in its basic 
premises and approach. 
Hence, the sociology of contentious politics seems to be trapped in the ’68 moment (with a touch of 
’89). However, being stuck in the long 1960s does not help us understand the current conundrum. 
First of all, the 1960s were a very specific historical moment marking the apogee of the progres-
sive liberal project, including the consolidation of consumption, full employment and strong organ-
ised labour. These premises are no longer available. Secondly, the 1960s movements came about 
at the climax of the drive of scientific rationalism, while today we live in times of religious revival, 
the Arab spring included. Thirdly, as a significant part of the 68 agenda – which included feminism, 
sexual rights and the liberalisation of mores in general – has been to a certain degree fulfilled, at 
least in the western world, contemporary movements rather tend to focus on other issues, such 
as distribution. The diminishing welfare state, the privatisation of public wealth and the ongoing 
difficulties in accessing full employment are the main issues on the agenda, none of which were 
actually under threat back when these theories were developed. In addition, the indignados, in par-
ticular, seem to be socially conservative in comparison to ’68, with no intention to radically reshape 
society or the status quo; their focus is on more voice and participation instead. If there is an issue 
that is worth discussing linking the past and the present, however, it is that of political representa-
tion; the 1960s and the present converge when it comes to the attack by activists on the oligarchic 
tendencies of states, ossified democratic parliamentarism and the demand for direct democratic 
processes in terms of decision making. 
All this means, in terms of the intellectual history I have presented above, is that different concep-
tual tools are desperately needed. Still, the institutionalisation of contentious politics and social 
movement theories, as regards academia and the canonisation of certain texts belonging to those 
schools of thought, are not promising factors in terms of the renewal of the field. Furthermore, 
the fact that the dominant scholars in the field of social movements no longer actively participate 
in contemporary social movements has rather led to a clinical and nonimaginative treatment of 
current movements so far. In contrast, independent scholars outside the mainstream (who often 
also happen to be activists) have tended to publish the most original work on recent movements.56 
By way of conclusion, we might say that when faced with the triptych “1968–1989–2011” it is the 
first one that still defines to a greater or lesser extent how we view and experience collective mobi-
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lisations, at least in Euro-Atlantic societies. Within this context, 1968 and its new social movement 
afterlives gave rise to the social movement discipline, providing the tools, scope and thus object of 
research with respect to collective “contestatory” mobilisation. 1968 and the long 1960s and their 
aftermaths have been narrated in many distinct ways, creating an imaginary past and a movement 
yardstick against which all collective mobilisations are measured. Moreover, people connected to 
the movements, either organically or just contextually, have developed what has been the domi-
nant paradigm in terms of social movements. All dominant theories ever since have derived from 
a certain sensitivity that was connected to that time and the political lessons thereof. 1989, on the 
other hand, is a year that did not manage to change this paradigm, despite the fact that authors 
insisted on the crucial role of civil society as a social actor. Finally, in terms of 2011, it remains to 
be seen whether the “moment of change” that brought the Arab spring and the indignados about 
will be looked on in future years as a new 1968 or a new 1989, or simply as another year in a long 
succession of political changes. Or maybe this type of historical framing and comparison will be 
deemed to be entirely misplaced, marking the onset of a distinctly new paradigm in social protest, 
functioning as a contestatory depot for future activists as well as theoreticians. 
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